I. To the Question

82. This question can be understood either about the end obscurely apprehended in general, as we conceive beatitude in general, or about it obscurely apprehended in particular, as we conceive beatitude in the Triune God; or about the end clearly seen in one who has his will supernaturally elevated, as in the case of one who has a perfect will by supernatural habit, or fourth about the end clearly seen in one who does not have a supernatural habit in his will, and this on the supposition that God might, of his absolute will, show himself to an intellect without giving any supernatural habit to the will.

A. The Opinion of Others

83. [Article 1] - About these four articles [n.82] it is said first, as to the first, that the will of necessity enjoys the ultimate end thus apprehended obscurely and in general. There is a triple proof:

First by the remark at Physics 2.9.200a15-16: “As the principle is in speculative things, so the end is in doable things;” but the intellect of necessity assents to the first speculative principles;     therefore the will of necessity assents to the ultimate end in doables.

84. There is a second proof for the same thing, that the will necessarily wills that by participation in which it wills whatever it wills; but by participation in the ultimate end it wills whatever it wills; therefore etc     . - The proof of the minor is that the will wills no other thing except insofar as that thing is a good; but every other good seems to be a participation in the ultimate end, which is the supreme good, as seems to be proved by Augustine On the Trinity VIII ch.3 n.4: “Take away this good and that good,”     etc ., “and see the good itself if you can, the good of every good.”

85. Third, the same thing is proved in this way: the will can only not will a thing that has in it some defect of good or some idea of evil; in the ultimate end apprehended in general there is no defect of good or any idea of evil; therefore      etc.Interpolation: “Again, Augustine On the Trinity XIII ch.3 n.6, says that a certain mimic actor said that he knew what the many people present in the theatre wanted, meaning to understand this of happiness; but all those people would not want happiness or their ultimate end if they contingently wanted it; therefore they necessarily want it.” ²²

86. [Article 2] - As to the second article [n.82] it is said that when the end is thus obscurely apprehended in particular the will is able not to enjoy it; which can be proved because it can enjoy something which it knows to be incompossible with such end, as is clear in a mortal sinner.

87. [Article 3] - As to the third article [n.82] it is said that the will necessarily enjoys the end thus seen because of the third reason to the first article [n.85], since no idea of evil is found in it, nor any defect of good discovered in it, - and this if it see the end with practical vision, whatever may be true of speculative vision; and there is added here that the connection, or the necessity of the connection, is so great that God by his absolute power cannot separate practical vision from the enjoyment of him.

88. [Article 4] - As to the fourth article [n.82] it is said that it is impossible for a will not elevated by charity to enjoy the end even when seen, because acting presupposes being; therefore supernatural acting presupposes supernatural being; but a will of this sort does not have supernatural being, therefore it cannot have a supernatural act.

89. Again, it would then be possible for such a will to be blessed. The consequent is false, because then charity would not be necessary for the beatitude of the will. The consequence is proved as follows, because to enjoy the end when seen in particular seems to be beatitude, or to include beatitude formally.

90. An argument is also given in another way thus: when vision is posited enjoyment is necessarily posited, when vision is not posited enjoyment is taken away; therefore vision is the total cause of enjoyment; therefore it is simply nobler. Proof of the first consequence: otherwise all knowledge is taken away of what the cause is whose ‘by’, or whose sine qua non, anything at all will act on itself.

B. Attack on the Opinion of Others

91. [Against article 1] - Against the first article I argue. First as follows: Augustine in Retractions 1 ch.9 n.3 and ch.22 n.4 says that “nothing is so in the power of the will as is the will itself,” which is not understood save as to the elicited act.

92. From this come two conclusions: first, therefore the act of the will is more in the power of the will than any other act; second, therefore that act is in the power of the will not only mediately but also immediately.

From the first conclusion there comes further as follows: the act of the intellect about the end is in the power of the will; therefore the act of the will is too.

From the second conclusion there comes further as follows: therefore if the act of the will is in the power of the will by the mediation of an act of some other power, much more is this act immediately in the power of the will; but to will or not to will the end is in the power of the will by the mediation of an act of the intellect; therefore this act is immediately in the power of the will. The minor is plain, because it is in the power of the will to turn the intellect away from consideration of the end, whereby the will will not will the end, because it cannot have an act about something unknown.

Response: it is supremely in its power because it is immediately in its freedom; everything else is in its power by the mediation of some other volition, including what is not free but not such that it cannot be contradicted.

93. There is a confirmation for this reason, namely the first against the opinion [nn.91-92], and it can count as the second reason, namely that what, when not impeded, is compelled to act, of necessity removes, if it can, what prohibits its action; therefore if the will when not impeded is compelled of its nature to will the ultimate end, it necessarily removes, if it can do so, everything prohibiting the volition; but what prohibits this volition is non-consideration of the end, and this the will can remove by making the intellect stand in consideration of the end; therefore the will of necessity will make the intellect stand in consideration of the end. - The major of this argument is plain, because that which of itself is necessitated to act will never be prohibited except by something opposing it that overcomes its active virtue, as is clear in the case of a heavy object; for a heavy object will be prevented from falling because of something opposing it that overcomes its downward inclination, and, by parity of reasoning, the heavy object will, if it can, remove what is prohibiting it, and its fall is unimpeded once that thing is removed, because the heavy object removes what is opposing its effect as necessarily as it brings about the effect which that thing is opposing.Text cancelled by Scotus: “Confirmation for the reason [n.93]: wherever there is a necessary connection of extremes, there is also a necessary connection of the intermediates necessarily required for the union of the extremes, otherwise the necessary would depend on the contingent; but if the will necessarily enjoys an end shown to it, there will be a necessary connection of the terms among themselves and by the nature of those very extremes, therefore also of all the intermediates; but the one intermediate necessarily required for the union of those extremes is understanding of the end, therefore etc. Proof of the minor: if there is a necessary connection of the will to the end, it is a connection of the principal agent to the object about which it is acting; but necessity for acting can only exist in the principal agent through that by which it formally acts; but the will acts of its very self, therefore in itself will that necessity to the object exist. Therefore the first minor is plain. - The minor of the prosyllogism is proved in this way: a principal agent acts as a principal by no necessity save by that by which it acts as a principle, otherwise it would act by that necessity by which it is impossible for it to act; but it does not act as a principle save by that which is its formal idea of acting. This confirmation seems to exclude a certain response that might be given to the principal reason, about necessity simply and conditioned necessity; for it proves that if the will also necessarily enjoys the end shown to it, then it does so on account of the proper reasons of those extremes, which reasons have of themselves a necessary connection; therefore the will does not depend on anything other than the extremes, and so it is absolute, although there will be a necessary connection of the extremes between themselves and therefore of all the intermediates in their order. Response: the first minor is false unless it is understood of conditioned necessity, that is that, once understanding is presupposed, the necessity of enjoying which follows - which is a necessity in a certain respect, because it depends on the showing of the thing - that necessity, I say, is from the nature of the extremes; which is to say briefly: there is a necessary connection of the extremes if the showing precedes. But the minor is proved of absolute necessity by the nature of the extremes, therefore, in order to prove this, I reply to the minor and say that in a principal agent acting simply necessarily there is nothing by which it necessarily acts, and there is nothing required either for its acting necessarily, save only that by which it principally acts, because in a simply necessary agent the whole nature of its necessity is in it by that by which it is an agent. But in an something principally acting necessarily in a certain respect or conditionally the reason of its acting is not a sufficient reason for its acting necessarily but something else is required on which that necessity depends, because it is not from the idea of the agent alone. The second minor is therefore denied, because the conditioned necessity in something’s acting is not from that alone by which it principally acts but from that along with the presupposition of something else. - To the proof of the second minor I say that in that ‘act necessarily’ two things are included, both that with respect to ‘act’ there exists one ‘by which’, namely the formal reason of acting in the principal agent, with respect to ‘necessity’ there does not exist that reason alone but along with it the presupposition of something else. To the form [sc. of the argument], therefore, I say that one should not concede that there is something by which it necessarily acts, but that for that necessity there is required both that by which it acts and something else by which it does not act. But because in the intended proposition that on which the necessity depends is the same as that on which the action also depends, and that by which it acts is that by which it acts with some mode of acting (either necessarily therefore or contingently), therefore in order to prove the second minor one can say in another way that that by which it is active is not that by which it itself acts except on the presupposition of something else, but when the other thing is presupposed then there exists that by which it necessarily acts. [The preceding paragraphs of this cancelled text are marked by Scotus with the letters: c—c.] On the contrary: in the first instant of nature there is the preceding action, in the second the principal action. I ask how the principal acts in the second instant. If contingently, we have the intended proposition; if necessarily, then since it acts precisely through its proper form, both because it is acting principally and because what precedes is in no way its reason of acting, it follows that the form is then the reason for necessarily acting; but this is only possible from the determination of the form to the object and to action on the object; therefore the extremes have of their nature a necessary connection, and so to the necessary intermediates. - Again, nothing makes one do that which is placed under a condition, therefore neither to make one do it necessarily; therefore if there is necessity from that condition, it will also equally be necessity simply. Response to the first [objection on the contrary]: it acts in the second ‘now’ of nature necessarily, that is necessarily in a certain respect, because in the second ‘now’, namely as presupposing another ‘now’. On the contrary: that which, when it acts, necessarily acts, simply necessarily acts, because ‘necessarily’ and ‘contingently’ determine action for the time when the cause acts; for the generator necessarily generates, although on the presupposition of alteration, as much as is in its active form. And then further: so it is determined simply necessarily, as much as in its form, to every necessary intermediate; it tends to this necessarily when it can, therefore it tends to every intermediate necessarily as much as or when it can. Perhaps it is not in proximate potency save to operating about the object. - On the contrary: therefore it necessarily wills the understanding of the end if the end is presented to it as an understood object. ²³

94. If an instance is made against this reason by saying that the will does not simply necessarily enjoy the end but with conditioned necessity, namely on the supposition that the end is shown to it, and if the major is said to be true of something acting simply necessarily, I reply: this is not a solution, because things that can be impeded do not act simply necessarily but with conditioned necessity, namely if they are not impeded, and of these things the major is true;     therefore what is taken in the major is not ‘whatever necessarily acts necessarily removes, if it can, what removes it’ but: ‘whatever is not impeded necessarily acts’, etc     . [n.93], where a specification is made in the major about conditioned necessity.

95. If an instance is made in another way that the major [n.93] is true of those things that have a necessity with respect to what is principally intended similar to the necessity they have with respect to things necessary for that thing, of which thing there are only natural agents, and these agents throughout the whole process up to the ultimate thing intended act merely of natural necessity - but the will in one way regards the end in which all goodness exists, and for that reason necessarily, and in another way regards any other being in which there is a defect of good, and therefore regards anything else contingently - on the contrary: it is impossible for one extreme to regard with any necessity the other extreme without regarding with as much necessity any intermediate necessarily required between those extremes, otherwise a necessary thing would necessarily depend on a non-necessary thing; therefore the will tends to the end with the necessity with which it necessarily tends to the showing of the end, without which it is impossible for it to tend to the end.The preceding paragraphs, nn.94-95, are marked by Scotus with the letters: a—a. ²⁴

96. If, thirdly, an instance is made to the minor [n.93], that non-consideration does not properly prohibit the will from enjoying, one might argue otherwise as follows: whatever necessarily rests in something present to itself, necessarily holds it present to itself if it has it and can have it; the will by you necessarily rests in the end presented to it; therefore it necessarily holds the end once presented to it so that it might always be present. - The major is proved by induction: if a heavy object necessarily rests at the center, it necessarily makes itself present to the center, if it can, and the center present to it, and necessarily holds onto that presence as much as it can. The thing is apparent in sensitive appetite; if this appetite necessarily rests in a present delightful thing, it necessarily holds the sense as much as it can to that sensible object so that the object might be present to it to delight it. - The major is also proved by reason [mark k., see n.112] sinceHere Scotus gives as a superscript the letter: k. ²⁵ the fact that a thing necessarily rests in something present to it is on account of the perfect agreement of the latter to the former; on account of the same agreement it seems to desire equally necessarily the thing to be conjoined to itself as much as possible; but this conjunction takes place in the presence of the latter to the former.The preceding paragraph, n.96, is marked by Scotus with the letters: e—e. Then there is some text cancelled by Scotus: “It is proved [note q. n.112] in another way, that what necessarily rests in a thing when present, necessarily as far as depends on itself moves toward it when absent, at any rate it is apt to do so, although it may be impeded by something; therefore just as it would by that necessity be actually moved if it were not impeded, so if it is a superior mover it moves anything inferior to itself by which it can take away the impediments; such a movable inferior to the will is in the present case an intellect movable to the consideration of the end” [this cancelled text is marked by Scotus with the letter: q]. ²⁶

97. A response is made in another way to the major of the first reason [n.93], that it is true of what is said properly to be impeded, namely that it is prohibited from acting because of something else that overcomes its active virtue; it is not so here, but there is something else acting whose action is previous to the action of the will, and therefore the cessation of this something else is by extension said to prevent the will from willing, and about such the major is false. For although an agent that presupposes to its own action the action of another might move that other to act and, with that other acting first, would itself necessarily act by conditioned or concomitant necessity, yet it does not necessarily move that other to act first, because it does not simply necessarily act, just as that which is said properly to be impeded would simply necessarily act as much as depends on itself, although it only acts with conditioned necessity, namely on the supposition of the previous action; an example is about a power acting contingently, and yet once the act that generates the habit is in place it acts with the necessity of concomitance.This paragraph, n.97, is marked by Scotus with the letters: b—b. ²⁷

98. On the contrary: the necessity of acting only comes through something intrinsic to the active principle; the previous action is not something intrinsic to the active principle;     therefore , once it has been removed, there is a necessity of acting, and so absolute necessity. - And then the reply is as before: if there is a simple necessity for acting, therefore there is a simple necessity for doing that without which it cannot act, provided however this is in its power; but here it is; therefore etc     .

Confirmation: here the necessity is not of action to action, because one action is not the active reason with respect to the other; therefore the necessity is on account of the inclination of the power to the action; therefore the power is also necessarily inclined to the required intermediates, because there is no necessary connection between the extremes unless there is also a necessary connection of all the intermediates required for the connection of the extremes.

99. Response to these and to the principal argument [n.93]: here the necessity is conditioned, namely on the presupposition of something else; and I concede that the necessity is through something intrinsic to the principal agent and that it is a necessity in relation to the intermediates just as it is a necessity of the extremes to each other, but the whole is conditioned, namely by a presupposition of the showing of the object.

On the contrary: an agent that can be impeded does not act simply necessarily but conditionally, ‘if it is not impeded’ [n.94], but yet it necessarily removes the impediment if it can; therefore so here. Nor is the first response valid, the one about what is properly impeded that ‘the will is not properly impeded by non-understanding’ [n.97].The preceding paragraphs, nn.98-99, are marked by Scotus with the letters: c—c. ²⁸

100. [Again, propositions against article 1] g.For these propositions [from here to n.110] a note is added by Scotus: “And they are against the first article of the opinion.” ²⁹ WhateverIn place of nn.100-114 there is this interpolated text: “Against the first article [n.83] there is first the following argument: any power about a most perfect object presented to it, and it does not necessarily operate about anything else, necessarily continues its operation about that object as much as it can [n.100]; but the will necessarily operates about the ultimate end, which is the most perfect object, therefore it necessarily continues its operation as much as it can; the opposite of which we experience, because the will turns the intellect away from consideration of the ultimate end just as it turns it away from the consideration of other things. - There is proof of the major, and first in this way: the reason for necessarily operating is the same as for necessarily continuing the operation, if simply, simply, if when it can, when it can. Secondly, because if the power principally necessarily operates about the object when present, there is in the power itself a reason for always necessarily acting about it as far as depends on itself, or whenever it can if it can. Thirdly, because we see this in the sensitive appetite, and in the sense and the intellect. But it seems to be particularly true in the will, because the will does not cease to act of itself about any object save by turning itself away to some other object, whether a more agreeable or a more perfect one, or one to which it is more determined or inclined, which prevents it operating at the same time about the first object; but the end is the most perfect and the most agreeable object; to it alone is it necessitated, to it most of all is it inclined, in it does it most rest, and in it is it most pleased; the willing of it is compatible with the willing of any other thing. Again, any appetite that necessarily tends to the supremely most perfect apprehended object alone, necessarily determines itself if it can to the continued apprehension of it once it is in place. The virtue of this argument depends immediately on the preceding reason. But will necessarily tends to the apprehended end that is the most perfect object, therefore etc. Again, anything that necessarily acts once some previous action is in place, necessarily determines itself to that previous action if it can; but once the previous action of the intellect about the ultimate end is in place, the will necessarily tends to the ultimate end; therefore it necessarily determines itself to the action of the intellect as to the apprehension of it. The virtue of this reason is that necessity for an intermediate thing is the same as necessity for the extreme. Again, anything that necessarily acts when some previous action is in place necessarily determines itself to that previous action if it can [n.105]; but when a previous action of the intellect about the ultimate end is in place, the will tends necessarily to the ultimate end; therefore it necessarily determines itself to the action of the intellect as to the apprehension of the end. The power of this reason is that there is the same necessity for the end means as for the extremes. Again, whatever acts necessarily about a present object necessarily determines itself to the presence of it if it can [n.107]. Again, any appetite that necessarily tends to a known object, necessarily determines itself to the knowledge of it if it can [n.108]. To what is adduced against the first article, when it is said ‘any power about, etc.’ [at the beginning of this note], because the reason...” [continue as at n.114 below]. In place of this interpolated text there is, for nn.100-110, the following alternative interpolated text [from Appendix A]: “a. Anything that, when not impeded, necessarily acts, necessarily takes away the impediment if it can. b. Anything that necessarily acts when some previous action is in place, necessarily determines itself to that previous action if it can. c. A principal agent that necessarily acts when anything is in place in a secondary agent, is necessitated by the principal active principle. d. Anything that necessarily acts in the presence of the object necessarily determines itself, if it can, to the presence of it. e. If a power necessarily principally operates in the presence of the object, there is in that power the idea, as far as depends on itself, of necessarily acting on the object always, or whenever it can if it can. f. Any appetite that necessarily tends toward the object when it is known, necessarily determines itself to the knowledge of it if it can. g. Any power that necessarily tends toward the sole supreme and most perfect object when it is apprehended, necessarily determines itself to the apprehension of it if it can. h. Any power that necessarily operates in the presence to it of the most perfect object, necessarily continues the action as much as it can. i. Any power that necessarily operates-rests in the presence of the object, is necessarily moved, as far as depends on itself, toward that object when it is absent; agreement is a common cause. k. If there is a necessity in one extreme, simply or as far as depends on itself, to the other extreme, there will be a like necessity in it to any simply necessary intermediate between them.” ³⁰ power operates necessarily about the most perfect object and not about something else necessarily continues its operation as much as it can [n.133].

101. n. Whatever power necessarily rests-operates about an object present to it, necessarily moves toward it when absent as much as it can; agreement is the common cause [n.96].

102. t. If a power principally necessarily acts-operates about an object present to it, that power has the nature to act, as much as depends on itself, always necessarily about it, either whenever it can or if it can [n.96].

103. m. If an extreme has a necessity simply or as much as depends on itself to the other extreme, it will have a like necessity to any simply necessary intermediate between them [n.95].

104. a. Whatever when not impeded necessarily acts, necessarily takes away the impediment if it can [n.93].

105. b. Whatever necessarily acts when the preceding action is in place, necessarily determines that preceding action to be if it can [nn.97, 98].

106. c. A principal agent that necessarily acts when anything is put in place secondarily, is necessitated by an active principal principle [n.98].

107. d. Whatever necessarily acts about an object present to it, necessarily determines that it be present if it can [n.96].

108. e. Whatever appetite necessarily tends to a known object, necessarily determines itself to knowledge of it if it can [n.96].

109. f. Whatever appetite necessarily tends only to the supremely most perfect object when the object has been apprehended, necessarily determines itself to apprehension of the object if it can [n.96].

110. g. Whatever power necessarily operates about only the most perfect object, necessarily continues its operation as much as it can [n.100].

111. Note,Interpolated text [from Appendix A]: “From c, when the major is given, follows a, and follows b and d and f, each of which can be a major for the negative conclusion of the first article. - From i follows e. - g implies that the willing and understanding already in place are continued; the first from k, the second from i imply that things not in place necessarily must be put in place. h appears truer among these, because universally there seems to be the same reason for necessarily operating and necessarily continuing, if simply simply, if when it can when it can. - g is plain because we see this in sensitive appetite, in sense and, in intellect. Yet it seems most true in the will, because the will does not cease of itself to act about any object save by turning itself to some other thing, whether to a thing more agreeable or more perfect or to which it is more determined or inclined, which thing prevents the will operating about something else at the same time; but the end is the most perfect and most agreeable object; to it alone is the will necessitated, to it is it most inclined, in it does it most rest and in it is it most delighted; volition of the end is compatible with volition of anything else whatever.” ³¹ g. [nn.100, 110] appears to be truer among these: because there seems generally to be the same reason for necessarily acting or operating as for necessarily continuing - if simply, simply, if when it can, when it can; and because of t. above [n.102]; and because we see this by sense and understanding in sensitive appetite; and because it seems most true in the case of the will, since the will does not cease of itself to act about any object except by turning itself to some other object, either one more perfect or more agreeable, or one to which it is more determined or inclined, which object prevents it operating about the first one at the same time; but the end is the most perfect and most agreeable object: to it alone is the will necessitated, to it is it most inclined and in it does it most delight; the volition of it stands with the volition of anything else.

112. From the proof of g. there follows f. [n.109], at any rate if one understands the predicate ‘to apprehension of it’ to mean that the apprehension already in place is to be continued. If the predicate ‘to apprehension of it’ is taken of an apprehension to be put in place if it has not been put in place, then in this way f. does not follow from g. but is proved by the reason given above [n.95] ‘on the contrary: it is impossible for one extreme.’; but there is a necessity that the appetite tend to the object when it can, because it cannot so tend except in its presence; therefore there is thus a necessity with respect to any intermediate when the proximate power is capable of it. - Not so now e. [n.108], which is more universal, because it does not specify the object as ‘most perfect’ nor as ‘only’ [n.109]; it is proved however as f. is, but above at the place marked [k. in n.96] it is not proved first except about an apprehension already in place. To be set down are k. [n.96] and q. [footnote to n.96]; they are as it were a single proof. - d. [n.107] and b. [n.105] are very universal, hence they are approved; a. [n.104] is sufficiently dealt with [nn.93-95, 97-99], and is improper; the proper form returns in b.; but b. and d. are proved from c. [n.106], along with the major ‘on the contrary: it is impossible for one extreme.’ [n.95]; the deduction is made here under ‘Confirmation for the reason.’ [footnote to n.93]. - Therefore g. stands; c. is disputed; k. and q. are probable.

113. Note the following four points as a gloss on the many things posited above [nn.94-112]: g. is well proved [n.111], and it is a more evident way to a negative conclusion in the case of the first article of the question [n.82]; g. can also be proved from c. here [n.106], and c is proved hereunder, namely on the other side of the page [n.98, first paragraph]. - From m. here [n.103] as major, and from c. here [n.106], made to be major [n.98, first clause], a. follows, b. follows, d. and e. and f. follow, each of which can serve as major for a negative conclusion to the first article. - From n. here [n.101] follows e., which is a more particular major than a. or b. or d. - g. entails that a willing and understanding already in place are necessarily continued, the two other reasons (the first from m. and c., the second from n. [n.112]) entail that when not in place they must necessarily be put in place; this second entailment is more discordant but it less manifestly follows, the first entailment contrariwise.

114. In response to the first way of g. [nn.100, 110, 111], for the negative conclusion to the first article [n.82], which is about the will necessarily continuing its willing as much as it can:

Let the conclusion be conceded, nor let the will ever stop unless the intellect first at least in nature stops considering the end, etc.

115. And if it be argued that the will necessarily will continue that understanding as much as it can, by commanding it [n.93], - response: the conclusion does not follow, because the will does not necessarily will the understanding as it does will the end [n.95].

116. It is argued in another way: at least the will would never turn away from this understanding, because the will, when necessarily continuing dependently, does not by commanding destroy that on which it depends.

Response: while the consideration of the end stands, and so as a result the willing of it, something else is confusedly offered to it the consideration of which is commanded by the will, and thus indirectly the will turns the intellect from consideration of the end; and for the ‘now’ for which it is averted the consideration first in nature ceases and next in nature the volition itself.

117. Against the first response [n.115]: the necessity that is of the extreme to the extreme is the same as is the necessity to any necessary intermediate [n.103].

But here there is the reply in the preceding page above [n.95] that there is not the like relationship to any intermediate as there is to the end, and then it might be conceded that I can will this and not will that without which I cannot will this [n.95].

118. Against the other response [n.116]: the fourth proof of g. [n.111], that there is no other object more perfect, or none to which it is equally or more inclined than it is to this; a more perfect and necessary volition of something both more perfect and more agreeable more impedes a volition that is less such than conversely.

119. Again, a superior power inclines an inferior in a concordant way; therefore where it is more superior it more inclines.

120. Again, if an object is necessarily willed, therefore the willing of it is a more determinate willing than any other willing whatever; therefore the understanding of it too is more determinate than any other understanding whatever. The proof of both consequences is that the will wills to will because of the object and wills to understand because of the willing.

121. Again, we experience that the will impels us to understand the object to which the will is more prone.

122. Therefore it is conceded that the will never turns away [n.116] but only an occurrent phantasm, which is not in the power of the will, Augustine On Free Choice of the Will 3 ch.25 n.74.

Here against the second response [n.116], and also against the first [n.115]; it always continues as much as it can, but it cannot continue when some other phantasm occurs whose movement is not subject to itself.

Confirmation: the separated intellect will always persist in consideration of the ultimate end and in the volition of it, although sometimes there is volition of another thing; these things do indeed stand well together [n.111].

123. On the contrary: we experience that the will as freely turns the understanding from consideration of the end to a different object as it does with other objects.

124. Again, the intellect would, as much as depends on it, always persist in consideration of the end, because the end is the maximally moving object; therefore if it sometimes ceases, this will be by the command of the will.

125. Response: if the end were the object that in itself or also in its proper species moves, it is true that it would maximally move. But now, according to some, it moves only in something else that is more of a nature to move toward itself in itself than to the end. Or, for you, many phantasms move it to conceive a description of it as taken from common notions; therefore less than to other objects, for two reasons: first, because it is difficult to persist in consideration of a transcendent universal [1 d.3 p.1 q.3 n.26], for a phantasm moves rather to the most specific species [1 d.3 p.3 q.1 n.9], Augustine On the Trinity 8 ch.2 n.3: “When you begin to think what truth is, at once phantasms will present themselves to you;” second, because it is difficult to use many common notions at the same time for a description than to use individual ones separately.

126. Against this response: at any rate the separated intellect always considers those common notions at the same time; likewise, according to Henry [of Ghent] it has a proper concept of God.

127. Again, to the principal, for a negative conclusion to the first article [n.82]: The damned apprehend the ultimate end. If they necessarily will it, then they do so by the love and willing either of friendship or of concupiscence. Not in the first way, for that enjoyment is supremely right; nor in the second way, because they apprehend it as impossible for them.

128. Again, if loving the end is necessarily elicited once practical understanding is in place, and yet there is there the supreme idea of right and merit by congruity: then, because every other act of the will is acceptable and laudable only by virtue of that love, there would stand with any merit whatever the fact that the will would necessarily follow practical understanding, - against Anselm On the Virginal Conception ch.4.

129. Again, in something that is necessitated to acting of itself or to acting whenever it can act [n.102], there can be no habit; for thus there might be a habit in a stone, which is not simply necessitated to fall but as far as depends on itself [nn.93, and footnote thereto]. Therefore in the will with respect to the end there can be no habit. There is a confirmation about acquired habits: because these habits are only generated by acts, but now when the will acts it has a necessity de re [necessity in sensu diviso] to act.

The conclusion about acquired habits is conceded. - But this agrees with the Philosopher, because wisdom is a supreme habit [Ethics 6.7.1141a16-20, Metaphysics 1.2.983a6-7].

There is a proof that neither can there be a supernatural habit with respect to it, because it is not capable of another habit with respect to an act to which it is necessitated.

Response: it is not necessitated to love now of the end in particular, nor to love of it when seen in the fatherland, unless it is elevated. - The first is rejected as below against the second article [nn.134-135], the second as below against the third article [nn.136-140].

130. Against the reason [n.129] an instance is made, that it rejects habits in the intellect. It is conceded that the intellect as inclining has no habit but not the intellect as showing.Interpolation: “if the reasoning is valid, no habit will be posited in the intellect. - I say that one should not posit an inclining habit but habit of showing is very well required, which habit should not be posited in the will but only the inclining one; therefore the reasoning is good about the will but not about the intellect. I hold therefore that the will is able not to will the end in whatever way it is apprehended, whether obscurely or clearly, whether universally or in particular.” ³²

131. Again, a priori, every single power, as it has one first object, so also one mode with respect to the first object; therefore it has the same mode with respect to anything whatever in which its first object is per se included.

Response: it has some one mode which is per se, but the ensuing modes can vary, which modes agree from the nature of special objects with the power in its acting; of this sort are ‘necessarily’ and ‘contingently’. - But the per se mode is freely’ as this is contradistinguished from ‘naturally’; ‘freely’ however does not entail ‘contingently’.Interpolation: “On the contrary: ‘naturally’ and ‘contingently’ do not imply ‘freely’ in the way inferiors imply their superior; therefore they are not special modes contained under the first mode which is ‘freely’. - It is said that they are so as compared with the will, although simply speaking ‘necessarily’ and ‘freely’ are related as things exceeding to things exceeded.” ³³

132. Again, a priori, whatever any will wills necessarily if shown to it, this it simply necessarily wills; the thing is clear about the will of God, where infinity is as much the reason for necessity simply as if the object were shown.

133. Again,Text cancelled by Scotus: “Again, against the first article [n.83], every agent acting necessarily acts of necessity according to the ultimate of its power, because just as its action is not in its power, so neither its mode of acting, namely to act intensely or not intensely; therefore the will of necessity wills the end always very intensely and as much as it can, the opposite of which we experience. - The conclusion is conceded when the apprehension is equal and there is nothing to distract it.” ³⁴ a power free by participation does not tend more to a perfect object than to any object; therefore neither a power free by essence; but there is no difference between the end that is willed and other things that are willed except on the part of the perfection of the object. The antecedent is plain, because sight, which is a free power by participation, namely insofar as its act is subject to the command of the will, does not more necessarily see a very beautiful thing than a less beautiful thing; therefore it is turned away form each equally and each it sees equally contingently.

The response is that the major is true of the cognitive power but is not true of the appetitive power tending to the object apprehended by its own cognitive power; for more necessarily does a very beautiful sight delight the seeing power than does a less beautiful one, and if the appetite could carry itself to that sight by an elicited act, it would more necessarily carry itself or be carried to a more beautiful sight than to a less beautiful one.

134. [Against article 2] - Against the second article [n.86].Interpolation: “which I concede to be true, but” ³⁵ It seems that the first articles destroy the second article, because the reason, which is that in the ultimate end there is not any defect of good nor any malice [n.85], seems with equal efficacy to entail its conclusion about the ultimate end when apprehended in particular, or to entail it with more efficacy, because in the ultimate end in particular there is apprehended the whole idea of the end in general, nay there is also shown that the perfection of the end in general can exist in it alone, and so without any defect of good and without any malice either.

135. Likewise the second reason for the first member about participation [n.83] concludes more about the end apprehended in particular, for created goods, if they are good by participation, are more truly goods by participation in the ultimate end in particular than by participation in it in general; for they do not participate in it in general except because they participate in it in particular, since the participator has the participated for the cause or measure on which it essentially depends, and the dependence of a real being is only on a real being, and so on something singular.

136. [Against article 3] - Against the third article [n.87]. When an elicitive principle does not elicit necessarily, what possesses that principle does not necessarily act; nor does an elicitive principle, while being disposed in the same way, elicit necessarily now what before it was eliciting contingently, therefore neither will what possesses that principle necessarily act. But a will having the same charity that it has now was before eliciting the act of enjoying contingently, therefore it does not now necessarily elicit that act, since no change has been made on its part. This is plain in the rapture of Paul. If before he had a charity equal with that which he had during the rapture, there was no change on the part of his will nor on the part of the elicitive principle; therefore there was then no greater necessity for eliciting it than before.Interpolation: “nor consequently for acting.” ³⁶ At any rate there could have been an equal charity during the rapture and prior to it.

137. Or let the reason be formed in this way: the necessity of acting can only be through something intrinsic to the active principle; but, by the fact that the intellect now sees the object, there is no new thing intrinsic to the active principle in enjoying; therefore not a new necessity of acting either. - Proof of the major: otherwise the necessity of acting would not be by reason of the active principle, and so it would be by nothing or by something extrinsic; and if by something extrinsic, the acting would be through that, because the acting is through that through which is the necessity of acting. -The minor is plain: if vision in accord with this thing does not have the idea of active principle with respect to enjoyment, neither does the intellect nor anything in the intellect; also if vision in some other way has some nature of active principle, though not of the principal one but of the secondary one, then the major should be taken as determined in this way: ‘the necessity of acting is only through something intrinsic to the principal active principle’; for a secondary principle does not give necessity to a principal one, just as it does not determine it either to acting, but conversely the principal agent of itself uses in its own way the secondary one, so that if nothing in the principal one excludes contingency, the whole action will be contingent. The minor is thus plain, because through enjoyment nothing is intrinsic to the principal active principle;     therefore etc     .

138. Again, either the end moves to the act or the power does. If the end, it is plain there is no necessity, because the end moves necessarily to no created act. If the will moves,Text cancelled by Scotus: “and it does not have a difference on the part of the object except that of greater or lesser proximity.” ³⁷ then I argue: the diverse proximity to the agent of the thing that undergoes the action does not cause necessity but only a more intense action, as is plain of the hot with respect to heatable things that are more and less proximate; but the diverse presence of the known object, to wit seen and not seen, seems only to be as it were the diverse proximity to the will of what the act of will should be about; therefore it does not diversify necessity and non-necessity, but only makes the act to be more or less intense.Interpolation [from Appendix A]: “Besides, diverse proximity of the passive thing to the agent does not cause necessity but only a more intense action, as is plain in the case of heat with respect to heatable things that are in greater or lesser proximity; but the diverse presence of the known object, namely seen and not seen, seems only to be as it were the diverse proximity to the will of that which the act of will should be about; therefore it does not diversify necessity and non-necessity, but will only make a more and a less intense act.” ³⁸

139. Again, what is said in that article, that the act of vision is altogether impossible without enjoyment [n.87], does not seem to be true, because any absolute distinct natures whatever are so disposed that a prior nature can essentially exist in the absence of a later one without contradiction; those acts ‘vision’ and ‘enjoyment’ are two absolute natures; therefore vision, which is naturally prior, can exist without contradiction in the absence of the later, namely enjoyment.

140. A response is that the major is true of absolutes neither of which depends on another nor both on a third; but in the proposed case both depend on a third, as on the object causing and moving.

On the contrary: if they depend on a third necessarily causing them both, and not necessarily causing one though it cause the other, the major will still be true, because the prior will be able without contradiction to exist in the absence of the later.Interpolation: “or the argument goes like this: whatever is essentially prior to another can be made to exist by that agent by which neither are both necessarily produced nor is the later necessarily produced if the prior is.” ³⁹ But they do not depend on a third necessarily causing them both simply, as is clear; nor on a third necessarily causing the later if it causes the prior, because any absolute thingNote added by Scotus: “Note, ‘absolute’ excludes the following instance: ‘God is able not to cause a white thing, and thus not to cause a similar thing, therefore he can cause a white thing without causing a similar thing’; and this instance: ‘he is able not to cause a body, therefore to cause a body without a shape’, if shape only means the many respects of lines bounding a surface or of surfaces bounding a body as health means many proportions.” ⁴⁰ that is able non-necessarily to cause immediately is able non-necessarily to cause through an intermediate cause that is also caused, because that intermediate caused cause does not necessitate it to causing the absolute effect of the intermediate cause; therefore if it does not necessarily cause a later absolute, it does not necessarily cause it even when the prior cause is in place, if in any respect it is a cause.

141. [Against article 4] - Against the fourth article [n.88] the argument goes: that by which someone can simply act is the power; therefore if the will is not able from its natural properties to have an act about a seen end but it can have charity, charity is either simply a power of volition about that object or a part of the power of volition, both of which are false.

142. Again, if a willable object that is not sufficiently proximate or present to the will is sufficiently able to terminate an act of will, much more is the same object able to do so if it is more perfectly proximate or present to the will; therefore if some good obscurely apprehended can be willed by a will not elevated by a supernatural habit, much more can the same object clearly seen be in some way willed by such a will. I therefore concede the conclusions of these reasons [nn.141-142].

C. Scotus’ own Opinion

143. As for the first article [n.82] I say that just as the will enjoys non-necessarily the things that are for the end, so also does it non-necessarily enjoy an end apprehended obscurely or in general.

144. As for the second article [n.82] I concede along with the first opinion [n.86] that the will does not necessarily enjoy an end obscurely seen and in particular; nor is there nor should there be an argument against the first opinion as to the conclusion, but argument that the reasons put in the first article conclude against the second article, if they are valid [nn.134-135]. But how will someone who relies on them in the first article solve them in the second? Nay even the reasoning of them in the second article [n.86] seems to contradict the first article [n.83].

145. As for the third article [n.82] I say that an elevated will does not necessarily enjoy, as far as depends on its own part, an end thus seen.

146. As for the fourth [n.82] I say that a will not supernaturally elevated can enjoy the end.

D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

147. To the arguments for the opinion [nn.83-90]. To the first [n.83] I say that the likeness would entail many false things, because it would entail that just as we assent necessarily to the conclusions because of the principles, so we would assent necessarily to the things for the end because of the end, which is false. Therefore I say that the likeness holds as to two things, namely as to the order of these things and of those by comparing them among themselves, and as to the order of them by comparing them to powers that tend toward them in ordered fashion; I understand it thus, that as there is an order between those true things in themselves, so also between these good things, and just as those true things in ordered fashion are thus known, so also these good things would be thus things in ordered fashion to be willed. But there is no likeness as to the order of necessity in one and in the other, by comparing them to powers absolutely. For it is not necessary that the will keep the sort of order in its own acts that willable things naturally have of their nature; nor is the assent alike on this side and on that, because necessity exists in the intellect on account of the evidence of the object necessarily causing assent in the intellect: but there is not some goodness of the object that necessarily causes assent of the will, but the will freely assents to any good at all, and it freely assents to a greater good as it does to a lesser.

148. To the second, when the argument is about participation [n.84], I say that the major is false because the will wills nothing necessarily; and therefore it need not be that it necessarily will that thing by reason of which it wills everything else, if there were anything such. The minor is also false, because by virtue and by participation of the ultimate end it wills whatever it wills, because ‘by participation or by virtue of something the will wills other things’ can be understood in two ways: either by virtue or participation of it as of an efficient cause or as of something that contains it virtually, or by virtue of it as of a first object, because of which when willed it wills other things. If it is understood in the first way, the minor when assumed with the major is not to the purpose, because that by virtue of which as efficient cause something is willed need not itself be willed, just as that which is the efficient cause of something seen need not be seen; for it need not be that I first see God with my bodily eye if I see a color, which is a certain participation of God as efficient cause. If it be understood in the second way, namely of participation of it as first willed object, then the minor is false; for it is not by virtue of God willed that I will whatever is willed, because then every act of the will would be actual using, by referring it to the first willed object.Interpolation: “When you prove ‘they are good by participation’, I say that there is equivocation over the term participation, namely effectively, and thus it is true, or formally, and thus it is not true.” ⁴¹

149. To the third [n.85] it is in one way said that, although there is no defect there of any good nor any malice and therefore perhaps the will would not be able not to will it, because the object of not willing is the bad or the defective, yet it is able not to will that perfect good, because it is in the power of the will not only to will thus and thus but also to will and not to will, because its freedom is for acting and not acting. For if it can by commanding move other powers to act, not only thus and thus but also to determinately acting and not acting, it does not seem to have less freedom in respect of itself as to determination of act.Interpolation: “Augustine On the Trinity XIII ch.3 n.6, everyone wants to be happy; therefore everyone necessarily wants the ultimate end wherein is beatitude.” ⁴²,Text cancelled by Scotus: “Against this response I prove that if the will is able not to will, it can refuse to will, because if it cannot refuse to will, this is because it necessarily has in itself something to which that refusing to will is opposed. But this something can only be actual willing; the proof is that no habitual or aptitudinal inclination to willing is opposed to a very refusing to will. Even if it be granted that it is a not-refusing to will, this does not avoid the problem, because a negation agrees necessarily to no positive thing save on account of some affirmation necessarily agreeing with that positive thing on which the negation follows; and then that affirmation in the proposed case cannot be an habitual or aptitudinal inclination, because not-refusing to will does not follow on it, just as neither is refusing to will opposed to it, because the affirmation necessarily agreeing with the will, on account of which refusing to will is opposed to it, will be actual willing. If therefore it cannot refuse to will, it necessarily wills. - And this reason generally shows that to nothing susceptible of contraries and of intermediates, if it has intermediates, is any form of that genus opposed, or it shows that it is impossible for a form to be present in it unless some form of that genus is necessarily present in the same thing, or something else is, to which that which cannot be present in it is virtually opposed. Such a positive that is virtually opposed to a very refusing to will cannot be found in the proposed case. Response: the thing opposed to the refusing to will is the will, because the will only has a capacity for possible willing and refusing to will; but to refuse to will the end includes a contradiction, because it is not a possible object of this act. An example: to see a sound includes a contradiction by reason of the act and of the object, therefore the object is opposed to sight and sight is opposed to it and determines for itself not to see this, because sight is of a sight. So here. Nor is it discordant to deny that the end can be the object of hatred and beatitude of flight, but neither can misery be the object of concupiscence, because according to Augustine in Handbook of the Faith ch.105 n.28: “nor can we will to be wretched” [Lombard, Sentences 2 d.25 ch.3-5; Scotus 1 d.10 q. un n.10] [n.81].” ⁴³ And this seems capable of being shown through Augustine

Retractions 1 ch.9 n.3 and ch.22 n.4, where he intends that “nothing is so in the power of the will as is the will itself,” which is not understood save as to the elicited act [n.91].

150. It might, however, be said that the will itself through some elicited willing commands or prohibits the action of an inferior power. But it cannot thus suspend all willing, because then it would at the same time will nothing and will something. But however things may be with the suspension of all willing, the will can at least suspend every act about this object through some elicited willing, and in this way I refuse now to elicit anything about this object however more distinctly it may be shown to me. And thus refusing to will is a certain elicited act, one that as it were reflects back on willing the object, not an object that is present or was present, but one that could be present; which object, although it is not shown in itself, is nevertheless shown in its cause, namely in the object shown, which is of a nature to be, in some class of principle, the principle of an act.

151. It is in another way said to the third preceding reason [nn.149, 85] that it has not been proved that the will could not refuse to will the good in which there is found no idea of evil or of defect of good, just as it has not been proved that it could not will that in which is found no idea of good, and this either in reality or in apprehension before that thing is the term of the act of willing. About this perhaps there will be discussion elsewhere [2 d.6 q.2 n.13, d.43 q. un; 4 Suppl. d.49 p.2 q.2 nn.4-10].

152. To the authority of Augustine On the Trinity [n.84], that everyone wants to be blessed, therefore everyone necessarily wills the ultimate end in where there is beatitude, I say that he does not mean actual volition. For his intention is that the mimic actor, of whom he is speaking, would have spoken the truth about what everyone who was rushing together wanted had he said to them all: “You all want to be blessed.” But not everyone who was then rushing together to the spectacle had then actually the appetite for beatitude, because they did not all have actual thought about it. So he is speaking of habitual or aptitudinal volition, namely that whereby the will itself is ready for immediately inclining to an act of willing beatitude if beatitude is actually offered to it by the intellect.

153. Likewise, the authority is not to the purpose. Because if it is certain that everyone wills beatitude, this is not in an act of friendship, by willing for this beatific object well being for itself, but in an act of concupiscence, by willing that good as a sufficient good for itself, because it is not certain that disordered wills have the ordered delight of the first good as such, but all wills, whether ordered or disordered, have the concupiscence of willing, or the will of concupiscence, for what is good for them. But an act of concupiscence cannot be an act of enjoyment, because everyone who desires with concupiscence desires for something else what he loves with the love of friendship, and so the act of concupiscence is not an act of enjoyment but only the act of friendship is.

Therefore, although Augustine is speaking of the act of willing beatitude, he is however not speaking of an act of friendship but of an act of concupiscence, and so not of enjoyment, and thus it is not to the purpose.

154. To the argument for their fourth article, when they argue about doing and being [n.88], I say that the act would not be supernatural but natural, because the will can naturally will an act about an object in whatever way it is shown by the intellect; and because the act does not exceed the faculty of the power, so neither does the object as it is the term of the act of that power.

155. When it is said, second, that then such a will might be blessed [n.89], I say no, according to Augustine On the Trinity XIII ch.5 n.8: “The blessed have whatever they want and want nothing evil.” This definition must be understood in this way, that the blessed person is he who has whatever he can will in an ordered way, not merely whatever he now actually wills; for then some wayfarer could be blessed for the time when he is thinking about only one thing that he has in an ordered way. But the will could wish in an ordered way to have charity, because it can will not only to have the substance of the act of enjoying, but it can will to have an enjoyment accepted by God; if therefore it does not have it, it does not have whatever it can in an ordered way will. Also, the way charity is required, not for gratification of act but for some rank of perfection intrinsic to the act, will be discussed later [1 d.17 p.1 qq.1-2].

156. To the principal arguments. To the first [n.77] I say that a thing is agreeable aptitudinally or agreeable actually. A thing is agreeable aptitudinally that agrees to someone of itself and as much as depends on the nature of the thing, and such a thing agrees actually to everyone who does not have it in his power that a thing should actually agree or disagree with him; and for the reason that whatever agrees with someone naturally or aptitudinally, with his natural appetite or his sensitive appetite, agrees with him also actually. But it is in the power of the will that something actually agree or not agree with it; for nothing actually agrees with it save what actually pleases it. For this reason I deny the minor, when it is said that ‘the end necessarily agrees with the will’; for this is not true of actual agreement but of aptitudinal agreement.

Or in another way: if aptitudinal agreement alone is sufficient for delight, yet not for enjoyment; rather it is, by enjoyment, made to be actually agreeable whether it agrees aptitudinally or not. If the first thing supposed in this response is true, one must deny the consequence ‘delight, therefore enjoyment’.

To the second [n.78] I say that there is a different mode of acting in the action; ‘properly’ and ‘metaphorically’ destroy the likeness as far as necessity is concerned.

157. Or in another way: just as something properly acting necessarily moves something else contingently, thus something metaphorically acting necessarily moves something contingently. For the end which necessarily moves the efficient cause, to wit the natural agent, moves necessarily in a metaphorical way, because it is necessarily loved or naturally desired; but the end which moves the efficient cause contingently, moves contingently in a metaphorical way. But this efficient cause causes contingently and the end moves contingently in a metaphorical way.

158. To the third [n.79] I say that the immovable thing does not have to be some elicited act. For several different and movable heatings do not presuppose some one immovable heating, but they presuppose a first act, namely heat, which is a sufficient principle for eliciting all the various acts. So here, the volitions do not presuppose some one immovable volition, because then the will when it wills something for the end would always be under two acts, or at any rate under one act that is referring this to that, but they presuppose a first act, to wit the will, which is a sufficient reason for eliciting the various volitions.